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LNTRODUCTION 
This case study tells the story of a 3-year pilot program during which Africans and 
northern donors worked together to create a new grant-making institution, the West Africa 
Rural Foundation (WARF). WARF is an entirely African, non-governmental, professional 
foundation, one of the first of its kind in Africa. It organizes grants and training programs 
that build the capacity of African non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to deliver high 
quality services to rural communities. WARF serves the sub-region of Senegal, Gambia, 
Guinea-Bissau, Mali, and the Republic of Guinea. 
WARF represents a new generation of African organizations -- non-governmental, 
professionally-managed institutions with a clearly articulated mission as well as a board 
structure that frees the organization of built-in conflicts of interest between grantees and 
grant-makers. The effectiveness of this new generation of organizations like WARF 
encourages donors to transfer to them many of the functions of donors, northern NGOs, and 
consulting firms. The precise tasks such new African NGOs might perform are varied but 
certainly could include many of the typical donor tasks such as needs and sector analysis, 
priority setting, funding allocation decisions, program and project design, as well as basic 
program management, execution, accounting, and evaluation. This is not quite the same kind 
of delegation that takes place between a donor and a consulting firm, for it requires that the 
donor actively work to play a more passive, facilitating role rather than the role of sole 
decision-maker who hires others to execute their designs. 
The following sections of this paper will: 
* describe the pilot program that led to WARF, including the dilemmas, 
agreements, and preoccupations that affected WARF's initial staffing, board 
structure, constitution, mission and program 
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* identify particular management practices that contributed to WARF's character 
_as an institution and the quality of its program 
* highlight some of the reasons why WARF evolved into such an unusual and 
promising structure. 
A NEW LANDSCAPE OF NGO INSTITUTIONS 
To better understand how this new generation of African NGOs like WARF fits into 
the landscape of organizations providing rural services, it is useful to remember that until the 
1980's, the only institutions considered legitimate actors in rural areas were African 
government agencies and autonomously managed donor projects. The fiscal crisis of the 
1980's then forced African governments to eliminate most services to rural dwellers, who 
still formed a population majority in their countries. Into this institutional vacuum stepped a 
plethora of international NGOs, mostly funded through special windows available in their 
home countries from bi-lateral or multi-lateral foreign aid institutions. This period also saw 
the emergence of an African NGO sector vying with international NGOs for funding and 
responsibility for rural projects. 
In the 1990's, this African NGO sector began to differentiate into three levels, the 
third-level being the newest type of NGO to emerge. First-level NGOs are the quasi- 
traditional village-based groups found all over Africa. These village-based groups are weakly 
organized and have an unstable membership and level of activity. Traditionally, because 
donors saw them as representing the ultimate beneficiaries of development, these groups have 
received substantial amounts of the self-help money directed to Africa. At present they have 
little capacity to carry out development activities without ancillary technical or management 
assistance. A major concern of developers is how efficiently to deliver services to village 
groups and how to involve them in the design of effective local development activities. 
At the second level are the small service NGOs that have proliferated over the past 
2 
ten years. These include farmer federations in West Africa. These second-level NGOs, 
more formally structured than village-based organizations, use a small local staff to run 
service programs for one or more villages, village groups, or scattered individual farmers. 
They have also received an important share of the self-help and community development 
funds, often in the form of "NGO-support projects". Donors hope that these second-level 
institutions will eventually be able to reach many villages and manage substantial local 
development actions using a participatory style with farmers. These institutions, however, 
also need considerable strengthening before their services can be effective and their potential 
for addressing local problems can be realized. 
At the third level are the more recently created, non-governmental organizations 
operating at a national or regional scale. These provide highly skilled, "brain intensive" 
services to first-and second-level organizations. Managed by a new generation of African 
professionals, these third-level NGOs compete well in program quality, intellectual creativity, 
management skills, general competence and financial accountability with the many northern 
NGOs and NGO-support projects now operating in Africa. This is unusual and new in 
Africa and a reassuring trend. The diversity of third-level organizations that characterizes 
the mature democracies and even some parts of the developing world, such as South Asia 
and Latin America--health clinics, universities, think-tanks, policy organizations, civil rights 
institutions, foundations, environmental groups-- is thus only beginning to emerge in Africa. 
This diversity is to be desired because it is a vital source of creative solutions to local 
problems and because it creates an institutional space where African professionals can 
successfully commit themselves to managing African problems. 
The emergence of third-level organizations is also exciting because it means that 
shrinking international foreign aid institutions do not have to simply withdraw from Africa 
and that they have a new choice of partner, a non-governmental partner, to whom they can 
reliably transfer many functions. At the same time, these new, professional izing NGOs can 
provide much needed intellectual creativity and organizational stability to civil society, a 
stability that is very important in the newly democratizing countries of Africa. 
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How do we encourage the growth of these third-level organizations? Certainly we 
need to create-the institutional space for them by minimizing the use of donor and northern 
NGO-managed projects that monopolize so much of the available funding and technical 
assistance. Such institutions working in Africa might also shed some of their own functions 
onto these kind of non-governmental local institutions. If third-level NGOs do not exist in 
certain countries, donors may need to help build them so that such a transfer of functions 
may be possible in the future. This case study documents how one group of donors did just 
that by transferring some of their own grant-making activities to a new, African institution. 
OVERVIEW OF WARF 
The West Africa Rural Foundation (WARF) is the first professional, entirely African, 
grant-making foundation in West Africa. Founded in October 1993 as the result of a three- 
year experimental pilot program, WARF has a board of directors and professional staff 
composed only of citizens of the countries WARF works in: Senegal, Mali, Gambia, 
Guinea-Bissau, and the Republic of Guinea. 
WARF's mission statement reads: "to help solve the problems of rural society by 
strengthening African rural organizations and by promoting participatory methods of research 
and action for rural development." WARF interprets its mission as a challenge to long-term 
institution-building to develop an effective African NGO sector. WARF makes grants and 
organizes made-to-measure, in-the-field, institutional strengthening programs for new and 
existing organizations working in rural communities. WARF is thus a third-level institution, 
and its grantees include newer third-level organizations and second-level community 
organizations. They may be either farmer federations or service NGOs. Local 
circumstances and staff judgment determine grant recipients, with the requirement that all 
grantees must work in more than one village, demonstrate a credible field presence, have 
transparent management practices, and utilize participatory methods of working with farmers 
in villages. WARF staff bundle training and financial support for local NGOs into a small 
number of relatively large grants each year. WARF staff also organize and provide sustained 
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management and program advice to new grantees. 
WARF is not a project, a branch of a northern NGO, an inter-governmental regional 
institution, or a pass-through for northern donor agencies. It is an independent African 
institution with its own mission and program and is financed through local and international 
fund-raising activities. While WARF makes available a trust fund and fund accounting 
mechanism to accommodate donors who seek to target certain types of rural organizations or 
certain countries, WARF itself selects grantees and directly negotiates with the beneficiary 
organization. Further, while WARF offers intensive training and technical support services 
to its grantees, it does not offer these services as an independent contractor to other donor 
projects. This distinguishes it from many NGOs who do not have their own programs but 
who survive as service contractors to donor-managed projects. By allowing WARF to set its 
own agenda, WARF builds the leadership skills of African professionals to manage their own 
institution as well as to design, monitor, and improve their own service programs. They 
would be less likely to develop these skills if they simply carried out projects designed by 
international agencies and consulting firms. 
WARF has several unusual features that foster a professional approach to grant- 
making. First, WARF uses simple, but documented, criteria and procedures for selecting 
grantee organizations. Second, the board is self-selecting and composed of citizens of the 
countries where WARF works, with no seats reserved for particular ideological, special 
interest, or beneficiary groups. Board members must have professional experience, 
commitment to WARF's mission, and a track record of civic responsibility. The Board 
reflects the gender and national diversity of the population ultimately served by its programs. 
The Board hires and fires a professional director and financial controller, approves the annual 
program of work and budget, and commissions an annual external audit. Board members 
may not recommend individual organizations for grants; they may approve grants submitted 
to them by WARF's director. The director hires and supervises a staff and prepares an 
annual budget and program of work. These features permit WARF to make funding 
decisions above the fray of NGO and NGO/government rivalries. 
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WARF's small size also affects its "quality over quantity" grant strategy. With a total 
of 12 employees, WARF accepts only 4 to 5 new grantee organizations each year, usually 
one from each country. Each program officer intensively monitors and supports only 2 to 3 
organizations at a time. They aim to build capacity each year in a few organizations that can 
eventually influence other local organizations in a particular district or country. Over time, 
these grantees will be able to absorb larger, multi-year, institutional support grants with less 
technical assistance from WARF staff. This frees WARF to turn to other, weaker 
organizations while using older grantees as training resources. 
First-time grantees are strengthened over a one- to three-year period. During this 
period WARF staff structures financial support and practical, in-the-field training activities in 
such skills as objective-setting and action-planning, team-work, accounting, and strategic 
planning. It also guides new grantees through small, experimental skill-improvement projects 
in villages concerning preventive health care and agricultural productivity. This institutional 
strengthening period is based on a comprehensive, participatory organizational diagnosis. 
WARF's sub-regional character preserves its independence from any one government 
in the region. Based in Dakar, WARF presently operates in Senegal, western Mali, Gambia, 
and Guinea-Bissau, all accessible by road from Dakar. Eventually, small field offices will be 
established in Mali and the Republic of Guinea. This sub-regional orientation is desirable 
because it explicitly recognizes that WARF's countries are strongly linked through linguistic, 
commercial, historical, ecological, ethnic, and agricultural connections, as well as through 
significant cross-border movements of the population. 
Last, WARF is unusual in that it has a comprehensive management manual approved 
by its board. This manual covers the principles that guide WARF's administrative, 
accounting and grant-making procedures. It also documents guiding principles for these 
procedures. WARF is thus self-directed and has internal procedures that protect its director, 
staff, Board, and grantees from unclear and inscrutable management practices. This creates 
an environment with known "rules" in which it is safe for any person or component of the 
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organization to innovate. 
A FOUR-STEP PROCESS OF INSTITUTION-BUILDING 
' WARF was built in four over-lapping steps. Step one was creative planning to 
design a pilot program. During this year-long step, stakeholders organized informal 
discussions to define their ideas and unanswered questions about the respective roles of 
donors, international agencies, and the emerging African NGO sector. Creative planning 
yielded a proposal for a loosely designed, autonomous pilot program with a strong 
experimental, research character and specific learning objectives. 
Step two was carrying out the pilot program. This involved recruiting a staff and 
allowing them to develop a program in the field with local NGOs. The pilot program took 
three years. Its results were: a pertinent mission and high-quality program; tested accounting 
and management procedures for grant-making; and the identification and training of a group 
of long-term staff members, including a top management team. 
Step three involved the staff and advisory board in a participatory strategic planning 
process to constitute a board and develop a constitution and by-laws. During this step, 
stakeholders analyzed the lessons of the pilot experience, developed a preliminary mission 
statement for a new institution to succeed the pilot, and put into place a tripartite 
organizational structure -- board, director, staff -- to continue the program under the aegis of 
a new institution. At the same time, the stakeholder group resolved many constitutional and 
legal issues. 
Step four was to secure funding for the new institution based on a detailed strategic 
plan and projected budget extending several years into the future. 
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STEP ONE: DEFINING THE PROBLEM AND DESIGNING A PILOT PROGRAM 
In 1988, representatives of three institutions operating in West Africa began a year- 
long, in-depth discussion over the problems of supporting NGOs and community-based 
organizations in the region. These three institutions shared a history of working together in 
this sector. They were Innovations et Reseaux pour le Developpement (IRED), a Swiss 
NGO with many links to farmer organizations in West Africa; and two donors, the Ford 
Foundation and the International Development Research Centre (IDRC). A prominent leader 
of the Senegalese NGO community who was also on IRED's governing board represented 
IRED in the discussions. The Ford Foundation and IDRC were represented by their field 
office program staff. 
The group noted that NGOs of all kinds were proliferating in the region, which meant 
that government agencies were no longer the sole actor in rural areas. Civil society was no 
longer a passive entity, but something lively, full of many new, small, independent 
organizations each contending for their ideas and a chance to provide services and promote 
local development. In fragile and emerging democracies, this vitality of civil society is 
important to nurture. However, competition over access to donors, rather than leading to 
quality improvements in rural programs, was leading to hostility and non-collaboration 
among NGOs and between NGOs and government. This often meant the demise of 
worthwhile local initiatives that depended on cooperation between local government, 
agricultural researchers, and NGOs to establish common plans around specific community 
problems. The group asked how international development assistance could encourage 
collaboration among these actors without jeopardizing the financial and programmatic 
independence of NGOs. 
Despite the excitement of watching a new type of institution emerge in Africa, it was 
also noted that African NGOs and community organizations were extremely weak. Most had 
leadership problems, and few practiced acceptable accounting procedures or produced audited 
financial and annual reports. NGOs lacked trained staff, pertinent mission statements, 
8 
program effectiveness, and coherent multi-year budgets or strategic plans. Donors and 
international organization still called the shots. Rather than defining a local vision of 
development, the managers of many NGOs were fearful of challenging what donors and 
international organizations wanted in villages. Hungry for stable salaries in a crisis 
economy, NGO managers ended up simply tailoring their projects to the current fads and 
priorities of the innumerable "drought and charity" donors active in the region. How could a 
grant-making structure financed by international development institutions help rural 
organizations identify accurately local priorities in such an environment? 
Prompted by leaders of farmer organizations, the group hypothesized that NGOs 
claiming to be village-based membership organizations were different from the typical service 
NGOs. Leaders of these organizations claimed that their aspirations to represent their farmer 
members created management and strategic problems not shared with professional service 
NGOs. Thus, a conventionally designed support program for NGOs might not adequately 
address the technical assistance needs of membership organizations. The group asked the 
pilot program to investigate this hypothesis. 
The group also noted that international NGOs tended to compete heavily with African 
organizations. Thus African NGOs had difficulty attracting, donor resources independent of 
affiliation with a northern NGO and were unable to chalk up the experience necessary to 
establish their own credibility. Could African NGOs compete with international or northern 
NGOs in terms of program quality and financial accountability? 
The initial group also agreed that donors, too, tended to worsen the situation by 
having unrealistic expectations of the capacity of NGOs and community organizations and by 
setting up competing and contradictory funding windows. They agreed that most donors did 
not have the language skills, technical knowledge, and field presence to accurately assess 
local organizational capacity. This lack of capacity combined with annual spending pressure 
inside donor agencies led to an "easy money" environment in which big winnings could go to 
any of those local organizations that mastered appropriate donor vocabulary rather than those 
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that were most likely to be effective. Predictably, this led to charges of fraud and 
mismanagement that threatened to undermine the credibility of the NGO sector. The group 
asked how external funding through grants might promote higher quality NGO programs, 
rather than just provide money. 
Participatory methods for rural research and development were also very much in 
fashion, but they appeared to be the monopoly of highly educated researchers. Few NGOs 
who claimed to use participatory methods could articulate what this really meant in practice. 
How could such participatory and action-research methods be made operational and 
accessible to a weak NGO sector? 
]RED, Ford, and IDRC agreed to work together to answer these linked questions. 
An experimental, action-research pilot program, which the group extended for a third-year, 
was the vehicle through which answers were sought. This pilot program grew into WARF. 
STEP TWO: THE PILOT PROGRAM 
Introduction 
The pilot program was managed as an autonomous IRED project based in Dakar, with 
a three-year budget of $2 million, most of which was held as a grants fund for local NGOs. 
Originally, the program had seven objectives which were condensed to the following two 
goals: 
I. to develop an appropriate program of financial and technical support to NGOs 
that promoted effective participatory methodologies for rural development 
2. to create an African foundation to institutionalize the program. 
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Structure 
IRED provided the overall management and accounting services for the program. 
IRED hired an African Coordinator for the program, who played a director-like role. Ford 
and IDRC co-financed the budget. Ford also supplied a part-time Consultant with experience 
in West Africa to furnish the various partners with information on foundation-like structures 
elsewhere in the world. IDRC also provided a full-time Advisor to advise on methodologies 
for the research aspects of the program, to train new staff in grant-making and to help 
develop the new structure. 
The initial field-level management team consisted of the African Coordinator and 
IDRC Advisor. These, in turn, recruited a small professional staff. This group formed the 
operational program unit, who took programmatic guidance from a specially created Program 
Committee. This Committee functioned as an Advisory Board with five members: IRED's 
regional representative, a citizen of Niger, who chaired the committee; one staff member 
each from Ford and IDRC's Dakar offices; the president of Mali's only independent 
federation of farmers' cooperatives; and the retired president of FONGS which is Senegal's 
national federation of rural associations. The Program Committee met twice a year to 
review the staff's work and grants, and to discuss the structure of an institution to succeed 
the pilot program. The Committee also served as a sounding board to discuss and solve the 
innumerable knotty management problems that arose during the three years of the initiative. 
The IRED board member who formed part of the original working group with IDRC 
and Ford did not join the Program Committee because he was elected president of FONGS at 
about the same time as the pilot program began. As FONGS members were potential 
beneficiaries of the pilot program, he felt that serving on the Committee would constitute a 
conflict of interest whereby FONGS members would pressure him to allocate pilot program 
grants to their organizations. He did, however, continue to play an important, informal 
advisory role throughout the pilot period. As one of the original stakeholders, the program's 
staff and donors recognize him as one of the originators of the very idea of WARE 
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The flexible character of the pilot program 
To test grant mechanisms for NGOs, the three partner institutions set up the pilot 
program as a foundation-like structure, in order to give it a flexible, experimental character, 
allowing rapid change in program strategy as understanding of the issues and problems of the 
NGO sector increased. Staff members acted as program officers, organizing and 
documenting grants, which they submitted to the Program Committee for approval. 
Several elements of the pilot program's structure ensured flexibility for the staff: 
* the Program Committee delegated to them full spending authority, except for 
grants above a certain size, and reviewed that spending every six months to 
assure that grants fell within the guidelines approved by the Committee 
* the program budget was limited to a few simple line items, so staff had great 
flexibility to re-allocate funds as needed 
* having donors on the Program Committee meant that major changes, such as 
budget supplements or a one-year extension, could be rapidly acted on as part 
of the normal process of committee meetings 
staff members were hired as consultants prior to being offered employment 
commitments, thus allowing the program to experiment with its organizational 
chart and to select the most effective professionals available 
* the Committee allowed the staff to alter the program mid-course, provided 
arguments for doing so were carefully reasoned and explored with the 
Committee, prior to their being implemented. 
The Ford Foundation assured flexibility by supplementing the initial budget, financing 
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another NGO to lend an African sociologist to the program, and covering the cost of 
additional training for program staff. The field presence, availability, and consensus-building 
approach of Ford Foundation staff members assured continuity and on-going donor 
commitment to the program. 
IDRC helped assure flexibility by supplementing the initial budget and by funding and 
providing a full-time Advisor. The Advisor's role was designed to change over time and to 
adapt to needs as the pilot program evolved. For example, at the beginning, the Advisor had 
a strong management function with the Coordinator, while at another she acted as a spare 
program officer, developing training materials and traveling in the field with the other staff. 
At another point she facilitated orientation sessions for board members and wrote a 
procedures manual with the Controller. Her willingness to be a "jack-of-all-trades" and to 
relinquish authority during the start-up phase provided flexibility-in-action during the pilot 
stage. 
In keeping with the learning objectives, most Committee members did not focus on 
impact evaluation of the operational team, but rather worked directly with the team, to 
explore management processes and assess programmatic ideas. Many such sessions led those 
who participated to conclude that programs are best appraised in the field using a learning 
laboratory model. This consensus-building and process-oriented approach were very 
important: it increased the number of ideas that the program staff tried out. It also reflected 
the African staff's own approach to the crafting of grants with local NGOs in the region. 
Perhaps most importantly, by demonstrating and encouraging the importance of the African 
staff's initiative and point of view, it enabled a smooth transition from a pilot program 
staffed by a number of different constituencies to a firmly established organization staffed 
and directed by Africans. 
It was also important that the Africans involved believed that the donors were intent 
on transferring real power to the new institution. The African staff saw a real need for an 
African-run, non-governmental donor agency and they committed themselves to using the 
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pilot program as a vehicle to create one. The unusual talents of the Senegalese program 
Coordinator, who eventually became director of WARF, were instrumental in bringing this 
about. His economics degree, background in participatory research with farmer federations 
and intensive knowledge of the NGO sector earned him credibility and recognition, while his 
leadership skills were an invaluable asset to building a strong, cohesive, and effective 
organization. He was skilled in balancing the needs and interests of the Program Committee, 
potential beneficiaries, and the other African staff members. Similarly, his own willingness 
to acquire the new skills of grant-making set the tone for thoughtful learning by everyone 
involved in the pilot phase. 
Creating a management team 
As the pilot program was launched, the three institutions involved thought to define 
an appropriate division of labor between the African Coordinator and expatriate Advisor 
within their shared power arrangement. Given constant changes in the program and staffing, 
the two individuals would have to frequently readjust their roles as the Coordinator assumed 
more and more authority and the Advisor less and less. Developing a division of labor 
beforehand was meant to sidestep the customary expatriate Advisor/African counterpart 
conflict over status and authority. Everyone concerned was well aware of the potential 
pitfalls inherent in a shared power relationship, and thus sought to address these problems 
before they came up. Doing so was facilitated by the fact that both parties brought 
complementary skills to the pilot program, exhibited a predisposition to work together, and 
showed a commitment to the goal of setting up an entirely African institution. These factors 
contributed to maintaining a good working relationship during so much change and 
experimentation. 
The initial group and Program Committee codified a division of labor between the 
expatriate advisor and the African coordinator via a Memorandum of Understanding. The 
Coordinator was responsible for reporting to IRED and supervising the staff and consultants, 
as well as for leading all grant negotiations. The Advisor was to help develop, test, and 
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document grant-making methods; organize training sessions in participatory community 
development methods for staff and grantees; and prepare an administrative and management 
manual tailored for the program. Initially, they jointly authorized all expenditures. Later, 
an African financial Controller replaced the Advisor as co-signatory. The Coordinator and 
Advisor also entered into a second, private agreement stating their intention to work through 
privately all differences of opinion on substantive issues, and thus present a united 
management face to the staff and Committee members. These two agreements laid the 
foundation for the synergistic teamwork that developed during the pilot stage. 
Recruiting and training staff 
The initial staff consisted of the IDRC Advisor, the African project Coordinator, a 
secretary, an accountant, and a number of short-term consultants. By the time the pilot grew 
to a full-fledged organization, a 7-person African team of highly qualified, experienced 
professionals was in place, including a two-person management team in the form of a 
Director and a Controller. The other professionals were an accountant, an administrative 
assistant, and three program officers. This transformation was gradual, the result of on- 
going development toward the goal of building an independent, professional structure. 
Gender equity, too, was a priority reflected in the outcome, so that at the end of the pilot 
phase, women occupied four of seven professional positions. 
Actually, building this staff team proved quite a challenge. In the first year, it 
became evident that a creative approach to staffing must be used. First, there was a shortage 
of trained local African professionals sufficiently knowledgeable about both grant-making and 
the NGO sector. In addition, the pilot was subject to restrictive national employment laws 
that largely precluding firing non-performing employees. Therefore, the initial team was 
comprised of consultants, interns, and borrowed staff from other agencies. These staffing 
stratagems made it possible to "audition" potential staff members without committing to 
premature long-term employment contracts. In fact, because of very high performance 
standards, the pilot program experienced a 50% turnover in staff; only the best and most 
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committed staff were offered contracts to remain. 
The management team met the challenge of finding and training a high-quality 
staff in a number of ways: 
* They gave high priority to ongoing, creative recruitment of potential staff 
members. Wooing dissatisfied African staff from other international donor 
agencies and research institutions proved one of the more successful 
techniques. 
* Program officers received on-the-job experience as trainers in participatory 
community development methods via a six-month training program. During 
this period, they were also afforded time to develop a model grant under the 
guidance of their more experienced colleagues. Graduation from this training 
phase meant a new contract and higher salary. 
* An experienced African sociologist with strong interests in the WARF program 
negotiated a secondment from his post in a small French research NGO to 
WARF, with financing from a separate Ford Foundation grant. 
* Flex-time and part-time contracts allowed several talented staff members to 
join the initiative before they were able to make a full-time commitment. 
* A young professional intern was hired to act as a trainer in participatory- 
methods and work on a small grants program. 
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Constructing a program to fit local realities 
The pilot program staff set out to break with the manner in which many donor and 
government agencies worked with rural people. It was well known that in many villages, 
several donors might be funding similar and at times contradictory projects, each unknown to 
the other. Village-based projects had a high failure rate. Many villages in West Africa have 
a history of startlingly similar and unsuccessful "projects" that follow the trends in the 
Western development literature and are often repeated in the same village by different 
donors: unused wells; rusted appropriate technology equipment; half-empty, western-style 
vegetable gardens; bankrupt village credit schemes; subsidized and mismanaged cereal banks; 
half-dead tree seedlings on a reforested quarter acre; and projects to produce ultimately 
unmarketable village crafts. The pilot program staff sought to understand what donors and 
government agencies were doing wrong and how village residents behaved when confronted 
with the massive influx of "drought and charity" money. 
Staff organized their learning through a classic small grants program, structured much 
like the small grants programs of many donor agencies in Africa. Over the first year and a 
half of the pilot, some 50 rural organizations submitted proposals and 13 were funded 
through this program. These first grants funded action and training programs and permitted 
the pilot program staff to study the effects of conventional grants on local NGOs and 
villages. The results were informative. About half of this first group of grantees were 
unable to implement successfully the activities they had proposed. Funds were often wasted, 
left unspent, or allocated to activities outside the parameters of the proposals. Pilot program 
staff quickly discovered that the local NGOs not only had managerial weaknesses, but that 
they lacked skills in participatory community development methods. Surprisingly, farmer 
federations turned out to be no more skilled or participatory than service NGOs. 
Federations in fact were structured very much like service NGOs and had similar 
management practices, program delivery methods, levels of legitimacy among farmer clients, 
efficiency problems, and skills. 
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One of the more important causes of this methodological weakness in NGOs was that 
regardless of organizational structure, most NGOs were unconsciously mimicking the top- 
down, authoritative methods of the defunct government agencies that had for so long 
dominated rural development. These defunct agencies had long provided the only model of 
rural development that NGO staff knew. Most NGO and farmer federation staff were in fact 
former employees of these very same government agencies. 
For example, a key method that NGOs were using, the "village meeting", was 
directly inspired by the traditional practices of the large government development 
bureaucracies and the "drought and charity" donors. These village meetings typically take 
place with much ceremony, dancing, and speech-making in a time-honored ritual well known 
to most rural professionals in West Africa. In this ritual, the wealthy honored guests sit on 
chairs behind a table facing a much poorer farming community all seated on the ground. 
With limited, but carefully orchestrated crowd-like attendance, chiefs and wealthy local 
political notables mediate the meetings so that the visitors receive a carefully laundered list of 
wants that coincide with the interests of local powerful political or social groups. From 
their point of view, at stake is money for one of West Africa's innumerable "popular 
participation" projects as well as a possibly lucrative. individual role in the project. The end 
result, however, is that the majority of village residents commit little time or energy to 
whatever project develops out of these ritualized village meetings. Rapid Rural Appraisal 
(RRA), a qualitative research technique, improved somewhat the situation but ultimately 
failed to provide an adequate methodological alternative to the village meeting. 
To be fair, the ineffectiveness of NGOs was not due only to their own organizational 
problems and weak skills. The village meeting also reflected a difficult village dynamic: the 
"passive opportunism" of farmers who were coping with the influx so many foreign donors 
and NGOs vying for their adhesion to an externally determined project aimed at a vaguely 
constituted "village group" that the donor would ask to meet with. To many farmers, the 
stream of donors represented a potential financial windfall that had little to do with village 
realities. The pilot sociologist even found that in many villages farmers thought the word 
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"project" meant "money" and not a self-help activity. Confronted with so many "windfall" 
opportunities, farmers were passive in the sense that many did not take the initiative to define 
local problems and take self-help action to address those local problems before the arrival of 
the donor. They were opportunistic in that the local notables, chiefs, and "village group" 
spokespersons would listen carefully for cues from donors about what type of activity the 
donor could finance and then express a "need" on behalf of the village or "village group" 
that corresponded to that donors priorities. Few donors escaped the astuteness of villager 
leaders and spokespersons in this regard. The source of this passive opportunism is complex 
and has to do with traditional power inequities within villages, differences in wealth and 
education among farmers, as well as the popular perception that donors just wanted to give 
away money but did not really care what happened to it once it was "given". 
For these reasons, few farmers participated in whatever project was at hand, and aid 
money was being wasted on misconceived activities. Just as discouraging was the 
development of "village groups" falsely claiming to be representative of the village in order 
to capture the aid money. This created considerable conflict in villages, conflict often hidden 
from donors because most village residents preferred that someone benefit from all the aid 
money rather than risk turning off the flow of funds altogether with complaints about which 
powerful locals were monopolizing the bene-fits. Fortunately, pilot staff also discovered that 
the more traditional self-help activities in most villages continued to exist, carefully hidden 
from donors and NGOs by ordinary village residents only peripherally involved in the new 
"village groups". 
Unfortunately, too many local NGOs ignored these complications and wound up 
mimicking poor donor and government agency practice such as the "village meeting". Often 
they simply had no incentive to do otherwise, given the uncoordinated and large numbers of 
donors channeling funds to NGOs. With so much "easy money" around, few organizations 
felt the need to learn and use the skills of participatory community work, skills which might 
have improved their effectiveness. Thus, many of the pilot program's potential grantees 
behaved as if the pilot's conventionally structured small grants were just another "easy 
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money" funding window for yet another stereotypical "village project". 
As a consequence, pilot program staff soon realized that they had to, a) develop an 
unconventional grants program, b) provide alternative community development methodologies 
for their grantees, and c) develop tools to distinguish between NGOs who simply wanted 
"easy" funding and those who were genuinely committed to delivering meaningful services to 
rural communities. They also would have to find ways to get other donors to fund long-term 
NGO programs that would stabilize NGOs and change the "easy money" environment to a 
responsible one that encouraged program effectiveness within local organizations. 
Testing methodologies for participatory community development 
After discovering that ordinary villagers were disaffected, program staff sought to 
develop tools for NGOs that would enable them to develop village-based activities that had 
greater farmer input and commitment to local development. Much of program officers' time 
was thus spent helping grantees experiment with different ways to accomplish this goal by 
testing with them innovations with a method called "Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA)". 
PRA, a modified version of RRA mentioned above, is a technique of information gathering 
and analysis with farmers that requires at least one temporary residency period in a village 
with the goal of obtaining widespread village commitment to specific problem-solving 
actions. 
This laboratory experimentation with PRA constituted one of the pilot programs' most 
important contributions to rural development in the region and is well-documented in 
WARF's published training manuals and case studies of PRA methodology. The pilot 
program pioneered the use of workshop techniques with farmers in a PRA framework to help 
local NGO grantees learn more of the reality of village dynamics and to build widespread 
village support for specific self-help actions facilitated by the local organization receiving a 
grant from the pilot program. 
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A two-step grant mechanism with built-in training 
Pilot program staff realized that a more appropriate grants program should combine 
extensive planning, on-site training in practical skills, careful screening and diagnosis of 
grantee organizations, and close monitoring of funded activities. This meant that the pilot 
program could not realize its goal of a positive qualitative change in grantee organizations 
through a large number of small grants, each of which risked monopolizing all of a program 
officer's time. Staff finally replaced the small grants program with a two-step grant cycle 
that addressed their grantees' weaknesses and built on their strengths. In the first phase, an 
organizational assessment led to a planning grant to a local organization. This first small 
grant provided funds to stabilize the grantee organization during a planning phase, and aimed 
at developing workable financial controls, a general strategic plan, and to guide the local 
organization's staff members through the acquisition of participatory community development 
skills by having them develop a village development activity in one or two villages on an 
experimental basis while using new methodologies. A second, larger grant then funded the 
organization's program in a larger number of villages according to an overall strategy, 
coherent community development methodology, and multi-year budget. 
Learning to be pro-active grant-makers 
Pilot staff also found that local organizations submitted very poor quality proposals 
that failed even elementary screening criteria. The pilot staff were obliged to spend several 
months developing more thorough proposals with grantees. They had to become pro-active 
grant-makers who did not wait at their desks for well-written proposals to arrive. They had 
to travel frequently in search of potential grantees, develop criteria and procedures to screen 
grantees, diagnose the organizational problems of potential grantees, and help grantees assess 
their strengths and weaknesses as a service-provider to rural communities. 
To manage this pro-active approach, the pilot program instituted monthly "grant 
pipeline" meetings during which program staff evaluated in-coming funding requests and 
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selected organizations that could receive a preliminary planning and training grant. The 
Controller filed the minutes of these meetings for eventual review by the Program 
Committee. The minutes included reasons why the staff accepted or rejected a preliminary 
funding request. Only those organizations which had won the support of at least two 
program staff members became potential grantees. This fostered accountability and 
professionalism by exposing the arguments for or against developing a grant to the judgment 
of more than one individual. It also encouraged program officers to work together to 
develop new grants. 
Once the staff accepted a potential grantee into the pipeline, program officers were 
called upon to lead a grant-making process involving both the grantee and the program 
officers themselves. Program officers could not simply act as judges of grantee proposals, 
but had to help the grantee develop a proposal worthy of funding. This grant-development 
phase mostly involved a series of activities with the grantee organization: a detailed 
institutional assessment, experimental community and economic development activities in 
villages; staff training; strategic planning; and objective-setting and proposal writing 
workshops. As a result, staff traveled frequently to the grantees' location to facilitate these 
activities. 
A substantial part of the screening procedure for selecting grantees was an 
institutional assessment of grantee organizations. Grantee and pilot staff members together 
formed a diagnostic team to conduct the assessment at the site of the grantee's institution. 
The assessment might also include village stays to examine NGO/village relationships. This 
assessment served two purposes. First, it allowed program staff to discern the seriousness of 
NGO claims to transparent management practices and to develop a made-to-measure planning 
and training grant for the beneficiary organization. Second, it gave the grantee organization 
an opportunity to examine, with outside help, the strengths and weaknesses of their 
organization and to focus their attention on how to become more effective in villages. In this 
way, most first-time grants to a local organization funded a one- to two-year period of 
capacity building. 
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Once a grant proposal with a detailed budget was ready to be evaluated by the 
Program Committee, the assigned program officer prepared a signed recommendation 
document, presenting his or her own arguments as to why the Program Committee should 
approve the grant. The quality of these recommendation documents was one of the 
evaluation criteria for program officer performance. Organizational teamwork was also a 
factor during this approval stage: only a grant signed by two members of the program staff 
could be submitted to the Program Committee. One of these signatures could of course be 
that of the Coordinator, but it did mean that no one person could force a grant through the 
system. 
Developing a new donor style and an organizational culture 
The pilot program also tested administrative procedures that aimed at minimizing the 
social distance between village residents, local NGO staff, and pilot program staff. For 
example, explicit travel policies required program staff to spent an average of seven days a 
month with villagers and NGO grantees, both during the grant-making period and while a 
project was underway, usually to facilitate training and planning activities. Time spent in 
villages figured as a criterion in annual staff evaluations upon which performance bonuses 
depended. To foster communication and in-depth understanding of local problems, each visit 
to a grantee ran several days and included a technical assistance component. To cover those 
rare instances in which villages could not provide accommodations with farm families, the 
pilot program even provided camping equipment. The use of hotels during field trips was 
strongly discouraged. The Coordinator and Advisor were not exempt from such a travel 
policy. They too traveled heavily, following the same policy. The message that both 
grantees and program staff received was that direct and in-depth communication with 
villagers while resident in a village was essential for the development of village activities. 
This practice also set an example for local NGOs about spending more time in villages. 
While program officers thus had considerable authority and initiative, they also know 
how they would be judged. To evaluate staff performance, the management team developed 
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a 14-page staff evaluation guide, drawn from the "Total Quality Management" paradigm. 
This fixed specific descriptions of five levels of performance: exceptional, above-average, 
average, below-average, and unacceptable. Each position in the organization, including that 
of the Controller and Coordinator, had position-specific behavioral variables and benchmarks 
for performance. Each staff member participated in the determination of the variables and 
benchmarks of his or her position. The Coordinator used this evaluation format in 
conducting annual performance evaluations. The Program Committee in turn evaluated the 
Coordinator. 
Though staff were paid relatively well by regional standards, those who did not meet 
performance standards were dismissed if efforts to help them improve failed. The program, 
therefore, developed a reputation as a demanding employee. At the same time, staff were 
given access to in-house training in computer and language skills. A computer loan program 
was instituted to enable staff to hone their new skills at home. In-house workshops, 
sometimes with grantees and consultants, sharpened program officer skills in strategic 
planning, organizational development, budgeting, planning, agricultural experimentation, 
preventive health care in villages, and action-research methods. This emphasis on staff 
training sent the clear message that the pilot program valued staff competence and was 
willing to invest its resources in the development of staff skills. 
With the aim of openness of communication and teamwork, the Coordinator held 
informal, office-wide planning sessions every week to share information, redistribute work- 
loads, fix common objectives, and report briefly on progress on major activities. He 
conducted more formal planning and review sessions on a quarterly basis. 
The staff also began the practice of convoking ad-hoc, informal problem-solving 
meetings among themselves or with one or both members of the management team. These 
meetings were informal and most often used brain-storming techniques and the ubiquitous 
flip-charts to clarify goals, processes, and to generate solutions to problems in developing 
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grants and to prepare grantee workshops using active training techniques. 
Another hallmark of the pilot program was the fact that it afforded grantees wide 
access to its offices. They were made to feel welcome. In fact, the staff selected office 
space in a residential neighborhood of Dakar that included a small yet inviting garden and 
open thatched house in which meetings with grantees were held. The doors were kept open 
and those without appointments were graciously received and got quick access to a program 
officer. Grantees were given assistance in compiling their financial reports, including an 
introduction to computers and spreadsheets. They also had access to the telephone, library, 
and photocopy machine while on business in the capital city. In these ways as well the pilot 
tried to distinguish itself from donor agencies which typically present themselves as heavily 
guarded, difficult-to-penetrate institutions somehow removed from the ordinary lives of local 
citizens rather than working to become organically entwined with the local communities. 
Last, tight controls over spending were a part of daily life in the pilot program, as the 
management team ran the program as a "thrifty" institution. This thriftiness was partly 
dictated by necessity, partly by the desire to make clear that the program was not being run 
along the lines of traditional donor agencies in the region. For example, Program Committee 
meetings featured local food, prepared and served in local style, and catering budgets were 
kept deliberately tiny. This was in great contrast to the round of lush hotel and catered 
cocktail parties characteristic of other donors in the region. 
This institutional culture of thriftiness, shared information, acknowledgement of 
difficulties, teamwork, delegation of responsibilities, solid working relationships with 
grantees, and open communication helped staff address minor problems before they became 
major ones. It also encouraged creativity in finding solutions to typical grantee problems in 
villages. In general, these management practices served to define a new type of local donor 
agency more at ease in villages than at international seminars. 
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Transforming ineffective "easy money" to effective co-funding of local organizations 
It turned out to be very difficult, though certainly rewarding, to assist even a few 
NGOs develop comprehensive multi-year programs that featured innovative participatory 
approaches to community development, well-planned staff development activities, and 
detailed multi-year budgets that included reasonable and documented overhead costs for the 
local NGO. Such comprehensive plans and budgets often required the commitment of 
several donors, not just the pilot program. The pilot's program officers thus found that they 
had to be aggressive in cajoling traditional "drought and charity" donors to co-fund the 
innovative programs of revitalized rural organizations. At first, they ran smack up against 
traditional donor practices that militated against this co-funding. ' For a host of reasons, most 
existing donors of local NGOs could or would not finance overhead costs, training, or multi- 
year budgets. Most seek to finance only very specific costs or types of activities, often 
requiring the use of equipment from the donor's country. 
In a simple, but real example of this, one foreign donor organization, while 
expressing willingness to co-finance a pilot program grantee, insisted that they would only 
finance activities that fell into the category of "food security" and that given their religious 
orientation, any health activities had to be excluded since they might end up providing family 
planning education. A closer look at their requirements found that "food security" really 
meant typical projects that had failed elsewhere, such as cereal banks, vegetable gardens, and 
village credit. The donor was immune to evidence, gathered from a year-long series of 
innovative PRAs conducted by the grantee with pilot program training, which revealed that 
farmers found health education and agricultural productivity improvement to be more 
pressing issues than the traditional projects. Nevertheless, the pilot program's staff did 
successfully negotiate coherent co-financing for the grantee in question, but not without 
considerable budgetary gymnastics and an attempt by the grantee to play the two donors off 
each other. WARF continues to cajole other donors to change their "easy money" for 
dubious traditional projects into co-financing of coordinated and well-thought out new 
programs in rural areas. 
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Thus, the program staff that WARF inherited from the pilot phase became 
sophisticated grant-makers with a useful service to offer local organizations. They had also 
created mechanisms to transfer their considerable skills in management and community 
development to their grantees. 
Because staff set out to learn more about the rural NGO sector and to develop a 
program suited to the sector and because the Program Committee was so flexible, the pilot 
changed considerably from its inception to the moment it became WARF. From an 
experimental cluster of services, the program became a highly organized entity which 
provided not just funds but valuable training and replicable community development 
methodologies. At first, the pilot was entirely oriented towards small grants to farmer 
federations. As the staff learned more, they created a variety of grant mechanisms for both 
service NGOs and farmer federations. Further, the large number of staff-produced village 
studies and method papers, many developed in response to a barrage of questions from other 
institutions, resulted in the creation of a full-fledged publications program. Similarly, 
training in participatory methods was first offered on an ad-hoc basis. As it became obvious 
that the need for such training was pretty much universal among grantees, the staff developed 
active training activities for all grantees and instituted an annual short-course open to any 
African organization whose work focused on rural development. 
STEP THREE: BUILDING THE FIRST WARF BOARD AND CONSTITUTION 
Once staff and program were in place, the pilot turned to developing a board for the 
future foundation. Months of Program Committee discussion led to agreement that staff 
members who intended to work in the new institution should take the lead in developing a 
draft strategic plan, constitution, and by-laws. The Program Committee would then work 
with the staff to assemble a board to whom the staff would be accountable in the future. 
The staff and Program Committee participated in a series of workshops to develop a 
mission statement, basic institutional structure, five-year budget, and outline for a five-year 
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program. Many people worked on the plan over several months, writing and rewriting it 
until there was consensus. The result of this work was a five-year strategic plan for the 
future foundation, which the staff named the West African Rural Foundation (WARF) in 
English and "Foundation Rurale de 1'Afrique de 1'Ouest" (FRAO) in French. 
A constitution and by-laws was drafted with input from consultants and lawyers after 
much comparative consultation of similar documents from other institutions in Africa, 
Europe, and the United States. The Program Committee also sought legal counsel in 
developing an agreement which could be used with the various African countries where the 
new institution would operate. This agreement would confer legal status on the new 
institution and assure its international character and diplomatic-like status within Senegal. 
The Program Committee debated for a year on the future composition of WARF's 
first board. Some members proposed that potential beneficiaries be on the board, to keep 
WARF true to its original constituency of community-based NGOs. Others, arguing against 
this idea, believing that conflict of interest would be unmanageable in such a situation. 
Some wanted donors on the board, to insure funding, while others felt that donors should 
relinquish their role to an all-African Board of Directors. The donors themselves were 
reluctant to serve on the board because they felt their presence would undermine the African 
character of the organization. 
Confl ict-of-interest was a new idea to most NGO members of the Committee. They 
had not worked within donor-like structures in which conflict-of-interest in grant-making can 
be a major issue. They were accustomed, rather, to the French association model for civil 
society, in which members of a group wanting to address a problem create an institution by 
electing board members from their own ranks. Other members of the Committee as well as 
the African staff members concurred that the French model had built-in conflict of interest in 
a grant-making structure. They felt that the new organization should follow more closely the 
British and North American "trust" type organization by recruiting an independent, African 
board from outside the beneficiary community, which would then self-select its own 
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members over time. 
The Board composition and conflict-of-interest issue were debated until the Senegalese 
delegate to IRED, now president of the farmer's organization FONGS, weighed in on the 
side of an independent, entirely African board without direct representatives of either NGOs, 
farmer organizations, or donors. Consensus around this model soon developed. NGO 
committee members stated that they would rather be grantees than Board members, 
particularly since their constituencies were pressuring them to return from the pilot's 
Committee meetings with funding for their own organizations. The group also agreed that 
the Committee should only recruit five Board members, the minimum quorum according to 
the draft by-laws, and then let the new Board recruit additional members up to the legal 
maximum of eleven members. 
Another issue was whether the Director would be a voting member of the board. 
After much consultation of standards, guidelines, and practice elsewhere, the Committee 
agreed that the Director would be a very useful member of the board by bringing to the table 
tremendous knowledge of the sector and the work of the organization. 
While the organization gave considerable authority and influence to the Director, care 
was taken to limit the power of the Director to prevent the organization from becoming an 
autocracy. The constitution and by-laws developed a balance of power among the Director, 
Board, and staff. For example, to balance the power of the Director, all agreed that the 
Board should nominate and evaluate the Director who, though given voting power on the 
Board, would work on a year-to-year contract. A second constitutional check on the 
Director's power lay in the financial arena. The Board was required to independently 
commission an annual external audit and to approve the annual budget and plan of work. The 
Treasurer would also be the Controller, nominated by the Director but confirmed annually in 
the post by the entire Board. A majority on the Board was also needed to dismiss the 
Controller, making the Controller in fact the only staff member the Director could not 
dismiss unilaterally. The Controller was also required to make an independent 
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administrative and managerial report to the board each year, separate from the annual 
external audit. This provided a forum in which, theoretically, the Controller could put on 
the agenda flagrant violations of procedure and principles. 
Once the Program Committee and staff resolved questions of Board composition and 
conflict-of-interest, it set about establishing criteria for Board membership and fixing a 
recruitment procedure for the first five members. The staff and Program Committee used a 
workshop format for these important steps in constituting the Board. 
It was ultimately decided that Board members should represent themselves rather than 
a particular interest group or constituency, although experience with the grant-receiving 
constituency was an important criterion in selecting members. Board members should also 
manifest a high level of commitment to civic affairs as well as an understanding and belief in 
the usefulness of the future foundation's mission. Another criterion was a high level of 
professional experience. Board members, they reasoned, should be people who would not be 
likely to use their Board membership to promote personal, political, ideological, or 
organizational agendas. They should be capable of assuming a neutral, professional stance 
on the types of issues that could reasonably be expected to arise in the course of a typical 
board meeting. The Committee also decided that WARF's constitution should specify limited 
mandates for Board members rather than confer lifetime membership. Board service was to 
be voluntary and unpaid. 
The Committee members also agreed that the pilot program Coordinator should be 
named the first Director of the new institution and that he, along with the senior African 
member of the Program Committee -- the founding president of FONGS -- should form a 
recruitment committee to seek at least five persons to serve on the initial Board. All 
members of the Program Committee, the African staff members, and various other persons 
in contact with the pilot program recommended to the recruitment committee candidates from 
Senegal, Mali, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, and the Republic of Guinea. 
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The recruitment committee sent standardized letters to everyone on this list, 
describing WARF's preliminary mission statement and program and soliciting their interest in 
serving on a volunteer WARF board. The recruitment committee arranged personal 
interviews for those who responded positively, the objective being to obtain more information 
about them and determine what, if any, conflicts of interest might arise. Some six months 
later, the recruitment committee developed a five-person short-list of screened candidates for 
the new Board and invited them to an orientation workshop that set forth the history and 
experience of the pilot program, explained the proposed constitution and by-laws, and 
presented the draft strategic plan of the future foundation. The Coordinator actively solicited 
their comments and concrete suggestions for the five-year plan and budget and the by-laws 
and constitution. These comments and suggestions were integrated into the final documents. 
The prospective Board members also agreed to the Director's proposal that they not alter 
substantially WARF's mission or program for at least two years so as to permit the Board to 
familiarize itself with the program issues and to get to know the staff. Thus the Board 
selection process was a serious one, and time-consuming. 
All present at the orientation workshop agreed to serve on the Board. Ultimately, 
only one member of the pilot's Program Committee stayed on as a member of WARF's 
board. The other member's of the Committee had removed themselves from consideration as 
possible Board members because they represented beneficiary groups, donors, or were not 
nationals of the countries WARF decided to work in. WARF's new Board confirmed the 
Program Committee's proposal that the pilot program's Coordinator become Director and the 
pilot program's Controller become WARF Treasurer and Controller. The Board elected a 
chair and submitted a country agreement to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs in Mali, 
Senegal, and the Gambia. WARF officially took over from the pilot program on October 1, 
1993 and a week later the Board met for its first official session. 
STEP FOUR: FUNDING THE NEW INSTITUTION 
After the end of the pilot program, donors continued to play an important, though 
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different role, by helping the new Board and staff develop a fund-raising strategy. They also 
supplied part-time technical assistance to WARF on an as-needed basis. As of this writing, 
WARF is presently funded by the Ford Foundation and IDRC and is in advanced n _tions 
with other donors. 
Once WARF's five-year budget has been covered, the Board plans a capital campaign 
to build an endowment which would finance the foundation through interest on investments. 
The Board intends to invest WARF's endowment through a northern non-profit capital 
management firm of the type that specializes in the management of endowments of small 
foundations. Interestingly, everyone involved argued in favor of the new Foundation 
establishing a successful track record before developing an endowment. This fourth phase of 
WARF's creation will continue until its endowment makes WARF financially self-sufficient. 
THE CHALLENGES AHEAD 
While the pilot program staff and Program Committee worked out most of the 
structural and programmatic issues about WARF as a new institution during the pilot phase, 
many important issues and challenges remain as WARF builds a body of experience and 
continues to test better ways of supporting NGOs and rural organizations. WARF faces 
challenges common to all new institutions in developing countries. 
The Director still must manage the ongoing challenge of recruiting and maintaining a 
high-quality staff despite a shortage of qualified African specialists working in rural 
development, a shortage particularly acute in Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, and the Republic of 
Guinea. Program officers will also need to maintain their level of commitment in the face of 
an exciting but grueling program of working with grantees in the field. 
WARF's Board must also grow to include up to six more members. At the same time 
the Board and the Director must develop and test a division of labor that affords each an 
appropriate role. While WARF's constitution and by-laws encode much of this relationship, 
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there remain gray areas which must be articulated according to individual personalities and 
experience. 
Lastly, WARF's donors face the challenge of helping the Board develop a fund- 
raising campaign to build the organization's endowment. This task will require exceptional 
commitment, energy, and astuteness among WARF's Board, staff, and supporters who will 
need to work together to build a consortium of long-term donors who understand the new 
paradigm in development assistance that WARF represents. 
MAJOR LESSONS 
WARF is an innovative, foundation-like institution with a high-quality program. The 
experience derived from setting up WARF holds a number of useful lessons for other 
agencies wishing to help create new, third-level NGOs in developing countries. 
Lesson l: START WITH A PILOT PROGRAM TO CLARIFY THE MISSION AND 
ACTIVITIES OF THE NEW INSTITUTION - 
The stakeholders only agreed to support a new institution after the pilot 
program staff developed a convincing, effective program to strengthen local 
organizations as well as a persuasive mission and institutional niche for the 
new institution. Pilot staff were able to accomplish this by constantly asking: 
"What are the problems of farmers and what is this institution best able to do 
to help local NGOs work with farmers to solve these problems?" Starting with 
a pilot allowed the donors to eventually commit themselves to a proven 
institution rather than to an unknown quantity. 
Lesson 2: MAINTAIN FLEXIBILITY BY UNDERDESIGNING RATHER THAN 
OVERDESIGNING THE PILOT PROGRAM - 
The pilot program that led to WARF had all sorts of built-in flexible elements, 
both intellectual and structural. In intellectual terms, the mission and structure 
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of the new institution were not pre-determined. No-one insisted on espousing 
in advance a particular theory of how the new institution would address rural 
problems or whether or not the new structure should be endowed. Similarly, 
when the original idea of working uniquely with farmer federations proved 
unworkable, nobody raised objections to the eclectic strategy of working with 
all types of NGOs. Structural flexibility came from a simple budget and the 
mechanism of a Program Committee which gave the staff the budgetary and 
programmatic latitude to study the problems of NGOs and to develop an 
appropriate grants program. 
Lesson 3: TAKE THE TIME TO SEE IT THROUGH TO THE END - 
It took three years to work out most of the kinks, resolve the conceptual 
problems of a new institution and identify and train the best possible staff. In 
a similar vein, WARF's donors did not abandon the institution, but instead 
followed up on their initial three-year commitment with a five-year 
commitment to see WARF through its first funding cycle and to help WARF 
develop a consortium of donors. Donors provided continuity to the initiative 
through the involvement throughout the program of experienced donor staff 
members who had an active role in the design of the program. There was 
always at least one person on hand who knew the history of the initiative, the 
personalities of the stakeholders and who were thus able to provide much 
needed perspective during constant change and experimentation. 
Lesson 4: BE FLEXIBLE IN ORDER TO SOLVE PROBLEMS ALONG THE WAY - 
Many different kinds of problems arose and all parties showed a remarkable 
ability to work through these problems rather than despairing in the face of 
them. Donors provided supplemental financial support to solve specific 
problems. They even anticipated that such support might be necessary in a 
deliberately underdesigned pilot program. Donors saw their role as that of 
facilitators, not directors. 
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Lesson 5: BUILD A NEUTRAL, DIVERSE, PROFESSIONAL BOARD WITHOUT 
BENEFICIARIES OR GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES - 
This decision built credibility for WARF by demonstrating that special 
interests, in the form of donors or others, did not own WARF. It meant that 
funding decisions could be professional ones, above the vicissitudes of 
individualized philanthropy and outside the politicized fray of 
NGO/government battles so typical in developing countries. If beneficiary or 
government involvement is essential, initiators of a new institution in a 
developing country can design an appropriate role for them on one or more 
advisory boards, in focus groups, and in an evaluatory capacity rather than on 
governing boards. 
Lesson 6: COLLABORATE WITH OTHER DONORS - 
The Ford Foundation and IDRC, rather than setting up rival and competing 
funding windows for NGOs, collaborated from the very beginning. They also 
worked hard to compromise and make their own procedures flexible and free 
of contradictions with each other's accountability requirements. It provided a 
useful example for the pilot program staff who indeed followed that example 
by negotiating with smaller donor agencies to co-fund the local organizations 
receiving grants from the pilot. 
Lesson 7: TAKE RISKS - 
There were plenty of nay-sayers as the pilot program began, because the very 
idea of an African foundation-like structure was so new. Many people and 
institutions put their careers and security on the line to be part of the initiative. 
IRED, for example, stood the chance of looking too much like a donor agency 
to its traditional partners, but it was willing to take that risk. The African 
staff sacrificed the security of their other jobs in more stable institutions to 
build something of their own. Last, donor staff members involved in the 
program risked seeming out of step with their institutions by supporting 
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something so unusual. 
Lesson 8: GIVE POWER TO THE LOCALS - 
Donors had to convince local professionals that the donor group really did 
intend to give meaningful power to the new institution. The best way to do 
this is for the donor group to make clear to the local advisory board, program 
committee, and staff how, when, and under what conditions a new institution 
would be funded. The donor group also had to let locals involved in such an 
initiative make specific important decisions, even if the donors felt a decision 
might be a mistake. Local commitment demands that staff and advisory board 
members do not act as "employees" of the donor group, but as institution- 
builders in their own right. In this regard, the pilot program could not have 
succeeded without the deep commitment of the African staff, especially that of 
the Coordinator/Director, to the problem-solving process inherent in building a 
new institution. This commitment arose from the fact that the donors let the 
staff's insights and experience shape the mission, program, and structure of the 
new institution. These power issues constitute of course a delicate balancing 
act for donors, with no fixed rules, particularly at the beginning of the pilot 
phase when they need to retain considerable explicit and implicit power. 
There will be other lessons as WARF continues to grow and develop as an institution. 
It will certainly have crises and new breakthroughs, as do all institutions, both new and old. 
WARF's experience, however, does show the high level of responsibility African 
professionals outside government can and will take to address rural problems, given an 
appropriate institutional framework. It also demonstrates that these professionals can 
successfully manage the growth of their own institutions. For donors, the experience points 
the way to an exciting, complex role as facilitators of new, independent, non-governmental 
institutions in Africa. As the WARF case shows, the rewards are great and demand of 
donors a willingness to take risks, to maintain intellectual and financial flexibility, and to 
make a long-term commitment to developing these new third-level institutions in Africa. 
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